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Towards a New Archimedean Point for Maternal
Versus Fetal Rights?
Pnina Lifshitz-Aviram* & Yehezkel Margalit** 
ABSTRACT
Some experts in the field have defined the year 2019 as “a critical time
for abortion rights,” since during the first half of the year alone 19 
American states enacted almost 60 abortion restrictions, including 26
abortion bans, and state legislators have introduced many more. This
Article reevaluates whether these recent shifts may amount to a real legal
tsunami that could yield a new Archimedean point for women’s and
fetuses’ rights, or only a temporary and shallow wave, which will probably
abate after the Trump presidency. After exploring in a nutshell the recent
restrictive as well as liberal developments in American abortion
regulation, this Article will extensively elaborate on the real meaning and
consequences of the 2019 Alabama case of “Baby Roe.” This Article will 
critically examine whether this is indeed a groundbreaking precedent with
far-reaching results or just an additional local ruling in a state with one
of the most stringent policies on abortion in the United States. After briefly 
exploring the two main and central doctrines—best interests of the child
and protection of his rights—this Article will thoroughly and
comprehensively discuss their problematic and nuanced implementation
in the hotly debated issue of abortion. Finally, this Article will discuss
whether the country is slowly but surely stepping towards a new
conceptualization of the fetus’s rights and more broadly towards a new 
Archimedean point for maternal versus fetal rights.
Copyright 2021, by PNINA LIFSHITZ-AVIRAM & YEHEZKEL MARGALIT.
* Lecturer of Law and Bioethics, Zefat Academic College; J.S.D. (Law)
Tel Aviv University; M.A. (Law) Tel Aviv University; LL.B. The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. Author of the books Informed Consent of Minors (2006)
(Heb.) and Delicate Balance (2016) (Heb.). The contribution of the two authors
is equal. Thanks to Naomi Cahn and Jon Herring for their useful comments.
** Visiting Research Scholar, New York University Law School (2011– 
2012); Senior Lecturer of Law, Netanya Academic College and Bar-Ilan
University; PhD (Law); M.A. (Law); LL.B. Bar-Ilan University. Author of the 
books The Jewish Family Family – Between Family Law and Contract Law
(2017) and Determining Legal Parentage – Between Family Law and Contract
Law (2019).
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  58 2/5/21  12:55 PM





    
   
   
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
    
     
 
      
 
     
    
 
    
 
       
      
      
   
 
     
      
   
 
  
    
    
  
448 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................. 448
I. Recent Restrictive Developments in American
Abortion Regulation..................................................................... 454
II. The Innovative? 2019 Alabama “Baby Roe” Case ...................... 457
III. The Best Interests of the Child and Protecting His Rights........... 463
IV. A New Conceptualization of the Fetus’s Rights? ........................ 466
V. Towards a New Archimedean Point of Rights? ........................... 472
Conclusion.................................................................................... 480
INTRODUCTION
Some experts have defined the year 2019 as “a critical time for
abortion rights,”1 since during the first half of the year alone 19 American
states enacted almost 60 abortion restrictions, including 26 abortion bans,
and state legislators introduced many more.2 Furthermore, as will be
extensively elaborated in the next section, by March 4, 2020, all clinics
intending to comply with the Trump Administration’s new gag rule must
have submitted a statement along with evidence that they have separated
facilities providing Title X services from those providing abortion services
or referrals.3 Indeed, the hotly debated abortion issue has been featured 
1. Elizabeth Nash, Abortion Rights in Peril — What Clinicians Need to
Know, 381 N. ENGL. J. MED. 497, 497 (2019).
2. Elizabeth Nash et al., State Policy Trends at Mid-Year 2019: States Race
to Ban or Protect Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (July 21, 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2019/07/state-policy-trends-mid-year-2019-
states-race-ban-or-protect-abortion [https://perma.cc/7PAZ-E9A8]; see also
Laura Portuondo, Abortion Regulation as Compelled Speech, 67 UCLA L. REV.
2 (2020); Ohio’s Fetal Abortion Ban Is Latest In Roe v. Wade Battle, FAM. L.
PROF. BLOG (Apr. 21, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019
/04/ohios-fetal-abortion-ban-is-latest-in-roe-v-wade-battle-.html [https://perma.c
c/7CL8-WGK9].
3. Korin Miller & Zahra Barnes, Here’s Why the Gag Rule on Abortion Is
So Dangerous and Misguided, SELF (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.self.com/story
/domestic-gag-rule-abortion-what-this-means [https://perma.cc/7BFD-6DAU];
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  59 2/5/21  12:55 PM





   
   
 
   
    
   
  
      
 
    
    
    
 
  
    
     
  
      
        




     
   
      
 
   
     
 
        
    
       
        
         
 
       
     
    
 
      
 
4492021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
strongly in the 2020 presidential campaign, as in all the previous ones.4 
This time, however, it has played a much more substantial and central role,
especially in light of the current majority-conservative makeup of the
American Supreme Court.5 
Indeed, abortion has been and remains one of the most bitter and
controversial dilemmas—medical, political, moral, legal, religious, social, 
psychological, and demographic—throughout human history.6 From time
immemorial, this complicated issue has been one of the most intractable
problems, inextricably intertwined with moral values and medical facts.
Some view it as unresolvable7 because the two sides on the issue are so
see Carole I. Chervin The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government
Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 401 (1989); Kumar Anuradha et
al., Conceptualising Abortion Stigma, 11 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 625 
(2009); Ann M. Starrs, The Trump global gag rule: an attack on US family planning 
and global health aid, 389 LANCET 485 (2017).
4. See, e.g., Maris A. Vinovskis, Abortion and the Presidential Election of
1976: A Multivariate Analysis of Voting Behavior, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1750 (1979);
Byron W. Daynes & Raymond Tatalovich, Presidential Politics and Abortion,
1972–1988, 22 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 545 (1992); Ashutosh Mishra, Partisan
Issue Linkages in Presidential Campaign Speeches: A Case Study of Abortion, 
CUREJ: C. UNDERGRADUATE RES. ELECTRONIC J. (2019); On Abortion Rights,




5. See, for example, Susan Jaffe, US election 2020: public health, 396
LANCET 946 (2020); Erin O’Leary, Raising the Stakes: When a Supreme Court
Justice Dies during an Election Year, SLU L. J. ONLINE 49 (2020), available at
https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lawjournalonline/49 [https://perma.cc/KZ7K-M69
5]; Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Health Policy in the Supreme Court and a New
Conservative Majority, 324 JAMA 2157 (2020), available at https://jama
network.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2772515 [https://perma.cc/P5G8-5D2D].
6. See AVRAHAM STEINBERG, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH MEDICAL ETHICS
(Fred Rosner trans., 2003); see, e.g., JOHN M. RIDDLE, CONTRACEPTION AND 
ABORTION FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE RENAISSANCE (1992); N. E. H.
HULL & PETER C. HOFFER, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION RIGHTS CONTROVERSY
IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2010); MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY
OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015).
7. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS (Stephen G. Post ed., 2003); see also
EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO
CONSENT (1996); Walter Block & Roy Whitehead, Compromising the
Uncompromisable: A Private Property Rights Approach to Resolving the
Abortion Controversy, 4 APPALACHIAN J. L. 1 (2005); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe
v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of Truth for the Anti-Abortion-Rights
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  60 2/5/21  12:55 PM




   
 
   
  
     
   
     
 
  
      
  
    
 
      
   
    
    
       
    
    
      
    
         
      
      
    
    
   
     
  
  
     
  
         
    
       
   
     
         
       
     
  
     
 
450 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
adamantly opposed. What for one side is the basic human right of any 
woman to autonomously control her pregnant body, is for the other side 
nothing less than killing a human being and feticide.8 In other words, 
equally thoughtful moral theories and reasoning have produced greatly
divergent conceptions of abortion. Even in 2019, as of this writing, the
longstanding debate appears to be in a deadlock.9 
From ancient times until today, the morality of medically assisting a
pregnant woman to abort her fetus has been dubious, for most cultures.10 
An absolute prohibition on rendering medical assistance to abort a fetus
features in the Hippocratic Oath, which dictates, “I shall not give a woman
an abortive pessary.”11 Roman Catholicism has a similar, stringent
approach, which has always treated abortion as a serious sin,12 whereas the
Movement?, 24 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 269 (2013) (“There will surely never
be a lasting cease-fire between opponents and supporters of abortion rights.”).
8. See, e.g., Nancy K. Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births
from Late Abortions, 72 GEO. L. J. 1451 (1984); Alison Tsao, Fetal Homicide 
Laws: Shield against Domestic Violence or Sword to Pierce Abortion Rights?, 25 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 457 (1998); Frank A. Chervenak & Laurence B.
McCullough, An ethically justified practical approach to offering,
recommending, performing, and referring for induced abortion and feticide, 201
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 560 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Angel Li, Northern Ireland deadlock impedes abortion rights
progress, 393 LANCET 1794 (2019); N. E. H. HULL ET AL., THE ABORTION RIGHTS
CONTROVERSY IN AMERICA: A LEGAL READER (2018); JENNY BROWN, WITHOUT
APOLOGY: THE ABORTION STRUGGLE NOW (2019).
10. See, e.g., Isabel De La Fuente Fonnest et al., Attitudes among health care 
professionals on the ethics of assisted reproductive technologies and legal 
abortion, 79 ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 49 (2000);
ROBERT YOUNG, MEDICALLY ASSISTED DEATH (2007); Julian Savulescu & Udo 
Schuklenk, Doctors Have no Right to Refuse Medical Assistance in Dying,
Abortion or Contraception, 31 BIOETHICS 162 (2016).
11. Thomas Rütten & Leonie von Reppert-Bismarck, Receptions of the
Hippocratic Oath in the Renaissance: The Prohibition of Abortion as a Case 
Study in Reception, 51 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 456 (1996); see also Howard
Markel, “I Swear By Apollo”—On Taking the Hippocratic Oath, 350 N. ENGL. J.
MED. 2026, 2027 (2004); STEVEN H. MILES, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH AND THE
ETHICS OF MEDICINE 81 (2005).
12. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Abortion and the Catholic Church: A Summary
History, 12 NAT. L. F. 85 (1967); TIMOTHY BYRNES & MARY C. SEGERS, THE 
CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE POLITICS OF ABORTION: A VIEW FROM THE STATES
(1991); Rishona Fleishman, The Battle against Reproductive Rights: The Impact
of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic
Arenas, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 277 (2000); Michele Dillon, Cultural 
Differences in the Abortion Discourse of the Catholic Church: Evidence from 
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  61 2/5/21  12:55 PM





    
 






   
 
    
   
  
 
     
   
 
      
      
    
    
   
   
         
   
        
      
    
   
   
   
      
    
  
        
  
      
       
    
     
 
  
     
     
4512021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
Protestant point of view has been much more complex and varied.13 
Judaism has a much more lenient conception, which takes a compromising
view, allowing abortion under several circumstances, if there are justified
moral grounds.14 Likewise, in Islam, there is a general permission to abort
on medical and health grounds, but only up to a certain stage of
pregnancy.15 
In modernity, by contrast, during the past three years, U.S. states and
countries abroad have taken some liberal steps. It is noteworthy that in
2017 a federal district court blocked a Texas ban on the safest and most
popular practice of medicated abortion, and simultaneously an Oklahoma
district court blocked a restriction on women’s access to medicated
abortions.16 In addition, against the Trump Administration’s attempts to 
reduce access to birth control, members of the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives have introduced the Protect Access to Birth Control Bill.17 
Four Countries, 57 SOC. RELIGION 25 (1996); Kenneth Mulligan, Pope John Paul
II and Catholic Opinion Toward the Death Penalty and Abortion, 87 SOC. SCI. Q.
739 (2006).
13. See Wm. Alex McIntosh & Jon P. Alston, Acceptance of Abortion among
White Catholics and Protestants, 1962 and 1975, 16 J. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 295
(1977); Barbara Finlay, Gender Differences in Attitudes toward Abortion among
Protestant Seminarians, 37 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 354 (1996); D. Paul Sullins,
Catholic/Protestant Trends on Abortion: Convergence and Polarity, 38 J. SCI.
STUD. RELIGION 354 (1999).
14. See generally DAVID M. FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL AND JEWISH LAW:
MARITAL RELATIONS, CONTRACEPTION, AND ABORTION AS SET FORTH IN THE
CLASSIC TEXTS OF JEWISH LAW (1968); DAVID M. FELDMAN, MARITAL
RELATIONS, CONCEPTION AND ABORTION IN JEWISH LAW (1978); DANIEL SCHIFF,
ABORTION IN JUDAISM (2002); STEINBERG, supra note 6; YECHIEL M. BARILAN,
JEWISH BIOETHICS: RABBINIC LAW AND THEOLOGY IN THEIR SOCIAL AND 
HISTORICAL CONTEXTS (2014).
15. See, e.g., Leila Hessini, Abortion and Islam: Policies and Practice in the
Middle East and North Africa, 15 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 75 (2007); Kiarash
Aramesh, Abortion: An Islamic Ethical View, 6 IRAN J. ALLERGY, ASTHMA &
IMMUNOLOGY 29 (2007); Yassar Abdullah Alamri, Islam and Abortion, 43 J.
ISLAMIC MED. ASS’N N. AM. 39 (2011); Vardit Rispler Chaim, The Right Not To
Be Born: Abortion of the Disadvantaged Fetus in Contemporary Fatwas, 89 
MUSLIM WORLD 130 (1999); Oren Asman, Abortion in Islamic Countries – Legal 
and Religious Aspects, 23 MED. & L. 73 (2004); Leila Hessini, Islam and
Abortion: The Diversity of Discourses and Practices, 39 IDS BULLETIN 18 (2009).
16. Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 280 F. Supp. 3d 938 (W.D. Tex.
2017); Okla. Coal. For Reprod. Just. v. Cline, 441 P.3d 1145 (Okla. 2019) (noting
the lower court decision).
17. Ursula Barry, Ireland on the Frontline: Challenging Foetal Rights
Ideologies, in DEBATING THE EIGHTH: REPEAL OR RETAIN? (Conor O’Riordan ed.,
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  62 2/5/21  12:55 PM





   
   
     
     
  
 
   
 
 
    
    
 
    
    
 
     
   
      
    
      
 
 
   





         
    
 
     
      
     
    
       
 
        
 
   
452 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
At the end of October 2019, California became the first state to mandate
free access to abortion medication at public colleges as a compulsory
duty.18 Similarly, from a global perspective, during the past two years
Ireland, Chile, South Korea, Argentina and Mexico have all legalized
abortion.19 New Zealand has moved to decriminalize abortion and, more
generally, since the year 2000 a total of 27 countries have broadened legal
access to abortion.20 
This Article will reevaluate, at the beginning of 2020, whether the
abovementioned tectonic shifts amount to a real legal tsunami that could
2018). But see Edgar Walters, Three Texas Towns Vote in Favor Of “Sanctuary
Cities for the Unborn,” Hoping to Ban Abortion, TEX. TRIBUNE (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/three-texas-towns-vote-in-favor-of-sanctu
ary-cities-for-the-unborn-hoping-to-ban-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/46EP-5U4L]; 
Jeffrey B. Bingenheimer & Patty Skuster, The Foreseeable Harms of Trump’s
Global Gag Rule, 48 STUD. FAM. PLAN. 279 (2017); Nathan C. Lo & Michele Barry,
The Perils of Trumping Science in Global Health—The Mexico City Policy and 
Beyond, 376 N. ENGL. J. MED 1399 (2017); Melissa Murray, Intimate Choices,
Public Threats — Reproductive and LGBTQ Rights under a Trump Administration, 
376 N. ENGL. J. MED 301 (2017).
18. S.B. 24, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); California Is First State to Mandate Access
to Abortion Medication at Public Colleges, FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/10/california-is-first-state-to-
mandate-access-to-abortion-medication-at-public-colleges-.html [https://perma.cc
/LJS8-HLGS]; see also Alexandra Desanctis, Massachusetts Bill Would Allow
Abortion until Birth, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/
corner/massachusetts-bill-would-allow-abortion-until-birth/ [https://perma.cc/MH
87-V9MH]; Marie Albiges, Virginia Democrats plan to remove many abortion
restrictions Republicans have supported, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.pilotonline.com/government/virginia/vp-nw-abortion-bills-20200127-
z6p7rzlzjbaoporukek66y5rje-story.html [https://perma.cc/J39Z-F7L9].
19. See JOHAN A. ELKINK ET AL., THE DEATH OF CONSERVATIVE IRELAND?
THE 2018 ABORTION REFERENDUM (2019), www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications
/workingpapers/gearywp201911.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN4H-QD36]; VIVALDI
MACHO & LIETA VALERIA, ABORTION IN CHILE: BIOPOLITICS AND
CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST RESISTANCE (2019); LAURA RAHM, GENDER-BIASED
SEX SELECTION IN SOUTH KOREA, INDIA AND VIETNAM: ASSESSING THE
INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC POLICY 101 (2020); Mexico’s Supreme Court Affirms
Abortion Access as Right, REPROD. RTS. PROF. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2019), https://
lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/2019/11/mexicos-supreme-court-
affirms-abortion-access-as-right.html [https://perma.cc/XL3E-K2R8].
20. See New Zealand Moves to Decriminalize Abortion, FAM. L. PROF. BLOG
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/08/new-
zealand-moves-to-decriminalize-abortion.html [https://perma.cc/JP4B-MJXB]; 
Nash, supra note 1.
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  63 2/5/21  12:55 PM










      
   
    
 
     
 
  
    
   








   
 
     
       
      
    
        
    
     
        
       
   




      
    
        
    
4532021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
yield a new Archimedean point for women’s and fetuses’ rights. As was
recently concluded, in the Trump era in the United States, fetal rights have
gained traction in the most dangerous of ways, reflected in the
undermining of contraceptive access and support services, the attack on
Obamacare, and escalating hostility towards abortion services and
providers.21 
Or it may all be just a temporary and shallow wave, which will 
probably abate after the Trump presidency. It should be emphasized that
when society debates over the appropriate range of women’s rights to
autonomous and unfettered access to abortion, the obvious flip side is a
possibly critical infringement of the fetus’s right to be born.22 That the
abortion debate seems to be at a dead end is strongly connected to the fact
that recent decades have witnessed a dramatic strengthening of both
women’s23 as well as fetuses’ rights.24 This strengthening in turn fuels the
lively discussion of this issue, which urgently requires fresh and up-to-
date reevaluation of this subject as suggested in this Article.
After this brief introduction and outline of its main goal, this Article
will start with a discussion in Part I by exploring the latest restrictive steps
in American abortion regulation, including the recent national laws and
federal and administrative actions, as well as the most up-to-date liberal
movements in the opposite direction, as briefly enumerated above.
Bearing in mind these contradictory and colliding shifts, in Part II this
Article will extensively describe the bizarre facts and innovative ruling in
the 2019 Alabama “Baby Roe” case, which has been harshly criticized by
many scholars, not least as “a troubling court decision for reproductive
21. Barry, supra note 17. 
22. See Robert F. Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, 17 W.
RES. L. REV. 465 (1965); George Schedler, Women’s Reproductive Rights: Is
There a Conflict with a Child’s Right to Be Born Free from Defects?, 7 J. LEGAL 
MED. 356 (1986); Shiva M. Singh et al., Fetal Alcohol and the Right to Be Born
Healthy, 5 FRONTIERS GENETICS 356 (2014). 
23. See Suzanne M. Alford, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, 52 DUKE
L. J. 1011 (2003); KATE GREASLEY & CHRISTOPHER KACZOR, ABORTION 
RIGHTS: FOR AND AGAINST (2017); UDI SOMMER & ALIZA FORMAN-RABINOVICI,
PRODUCING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS: DETERMINING ABORTION POLICY
WORLDWIDE (2019) (“With events and movements such as #MeToo, the Gender
Equality UN Sustainable Development Goal, the Irish and Chilean abortion policy
changes, and the worldwide Women’s March movement, women’s rights are at 
the top of the global public agenda.”).
24. See CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN’S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND 
THE POLITICS OF FETAL RIGHTS (1996); Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child’s
Right to Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1119 (1999); RITA JOSEPH, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE UNBORN CHILD (2009).
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  64 2/5/21  12:55 PM




    
  
     
 
   
 
   
  
  
    
  
 




   
   
 
   
    
 
     
     
   
   
  
 
        
 
 
     
 
 
          
 
   
    
   
  
        
454 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
rights.”25 This Article will critically examine whether this is indeed a 
groundbreaking precedent with far-reaching results or only an additional
local ruling in a state with one of the most stringent stances on abortion in 
the United States. 
This recent ruling will serve as a springboard for exploring, in Part III,
the full range of emerging fetal rights as stemming from the much broader
process of the entrenchment of two doctrines—the best interests of the
child and the protection of his rights. Part IV will discuss whether the
abovementioned ruling, together with legislative and administrative shifts,
may actually amount to a new conceptualization of the fetus’s rights. This
inquiry will directly lead to the main section of the Article, Part V, which
will deal with the much more complicated question of whether society is
slowly but surely stepping towards a new Archimedean point for maternal
versus fetal rights. 
I. RECENT RESTRICTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN ABORTION
REGULATION
As briefly mentioned at the outset of this Article, during the past half-
decade, the number and severity of legislative restrictions on abortion have
surged across the United States Some abortion activists have claimed  
that the ultimate target of these restrictions is to challenge the traditional,
permissive attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court In their view, these harsh
25. See Dov Fox et al., A Troubling Court Decision for Reproductive Rights:
Legal Recognition of Fetal Standing to Sue, 322 JAMA 23 (2019).
26. See Rape and Incest Exceptions Stripped from South Carolina Bill Banning 
Most Abortions, CBS NEWS (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/ news/rape-
and-incest-exceptions-stripped-from-south-carolina-bill-banning-most-abortions/
[https://perma.cc/PHR2-XUMD]; South Carolina Governor Says There’s “No 
Constitutional Right To Abortion,” FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2019), https:
//lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/11/south-carolina-governor-says-
theres-no-constitutional-right-to-abortion-.html [https://perma.cc/6234-84EB];
Overview of States Who Passed Abortion Restrictions, FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (Nov. 
6, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/11/overview-of-
states-who-passed-abortion-restrictions-.html [https://perma.cc/PV7S-H6D4].
27. See Nash et al., supra note 2; Nash, supra note 1, at 498; Mattie Quinn,
Restrictive Abortion Laws Have Consequences That Reach Far Beyond State 
Lines, SELF (July 31, 2019), https://www.self.com/story/abortion-restrictions-
ripple-effect [https://perma.cc/N6QV-RECH]. See generally CAROL SANGER,
ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
AMERICA (2017). See also Amicus Brief Filed by Members of Congress Invites the 
Supreme Court to Overrule Roe and Casey, What Is Really Making the Court’s
Abortion Precedent “Unworkable”?, REPROD. RTS. PROF. BLOG (Jan. 10, 2020),
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  65 2/5/21  12:55 PM












    
     
 
 
   
      
 
 
    
   
      
        
    
      
  
   
  
      
    
    
    




        
        
   
 
       
   
      
      
4552021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
restrictions are aimed at proscribing some, most, or even all sorts of
abortions. But even if the nightmare they allege does not come fully true,
so far the tough and detrimental consequences of these restrictions and 
bans on women’s health are clear and immediate The current American
turmoil regarding the abortion dilemma also has far-reaching and
substantial effects outside the United States,29 as well as in the
international context.30 
As part of the Trump administration’s stringent attitude towards
abortion, the traditional “gag rule,”31 which prevents health clinics from




28. See, e.g., As Abortion Restrictions Increase, Women Partake In “Self-
Induced” Abortions, FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2019), https://law
professors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/09/as-abortion-restrictions-increase-
women-partake-in-self-induced-abortions-.html [https://perma.cc/L43K-K6U3];
Barry, supra note 17 (“[A] Toronto woman died from a self-induced, coat-hanger
abortion.”); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note 7, at 19 (“[S]elf-induced
abortion has often involved risky procedures . . . .”).
29. See DAPHNA HACKER, LEGALIZED FAMILIES IN THE ERA OF BORDERED
GLOBALIZATION 117–48 (2016); Dutch Doctor Provides Abortion Pills to U.S. 
Women, Sues FDA, REPROD. RTS. PROF. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2019), https://law
professors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/2019/10/dutch-doctor-provides-abort
ion-pills-to-us-women-sues-fda.html [https://perma.cc/T4CZ-U2DW]; SOMMER &
FORMAN-RABINOVICI, supra note 23.
30. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, U.S. joins 19 nations, including Saudi
Arabia and Russia: ‘There is no international right to an abortion,’ WASH. POST
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/09/24/us-joins-
nations-including-saudi-arabia-russia-there-is-no-international-right-an-abortion/ 
[https://perma.cc/4D78-VL9Y]; see also JEAN VAN DER TAK, ABORTION,
FERTILITY, AND CHANGING LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW (1974);
Stellina Jolly, Right to Abortion under International Law, 23 EUBIOS J. ASIAN &
INT’L BIOETHICS 72 (2013); Carole J. Petersen, Reproductive Justice, Public 
Policy, and Abortion on the Basis of Fetal Impairment: Lessons from
International Human Rights Law and the Potential Impact of the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 28 J. L. & HEALTH 121, 144–60 (2015).
31. See Miller & Barnes, supra note 3; Chervin, supra note 3; Anuradha et
al., supra note 3; Starrs, supra note 3; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Scott
E. Johnson, Rust v. Sullivan: The Supreme Court Upholds the Title X Abortion-
Counseling Gag Rule, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 209 (1991); Michael Fitzpatrick, Rust
Corrodes: The First Amendment Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 185 (1992); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of
Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587 (1993).
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abortions or even just refer patients to clinics that do, has been
dramatically expanded.32 As a result, any physician, nurse, or family 
planning consultant who is eager to fulfill their basic duty to share with
the patient the full picture of her medical situation or possibilities must
conceal all of the information regarding abortion. Moreover, they are even 
forbidden to answer a patient’s questions about how to access an abortion
and to refer her to other clinics, where she may be exposed to this option.
As a direct result of this international and domestic gag rule, many
Title X grantees announced that they would leave the Title X program
instead of complying with this draconian rule. This federal program, which
makes family planning and other preventive health services more
affordable and accessible, used to finance around 4,000 clinics, which 
allowed them to assist over 4 million people each year.33 Now the gag rule 
requires them to implement a “financial and physical separation” between
both facilities and programs that provide any kind of health service and
those that provide abortions.34 
Planned Parenthood, which serves around 1.5 million Title X patients 
every year, or about 40% of all people who receive care from a Title X
clinic, left this federal family planning program on August 19, 2019.
Presumably, it is the first important organization to quit the federal
32. See Barry, supra note 17; Walters, supra note 17; Bingenheimer & 
Skuster, supra note 17; Lo & Barry, supra note 17; Murray, supra note 17; Daniel
Grossman, Sexual and Reproductive Health under the Trump Presidency: Policy
Change Threatens Women in the USA and Worldwide, 43 J. FAM. PLAN. &
REPROD. HEALTH CARE 89 (2017); Jerome A. Singh & Salim S. Abdool Karim, 
Trump’s “Global Gag Rule”: Implications for Human Rights and Global Health, 
5 LANCET GLOB. HEALTH 387 (2017); Sarah Pugh et al., Not Without a Fight:
Standing Up Against the Global Gag Rule, 25 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 14 
(2017).
33. See Chervin, supra note 3; Alexandra A. E. Shapiro, Title X, the Abortion
Debate, and the First Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1737 (1990); Christina I.
Fowler et al., Patterns and trends in contraceptive use among women attending
Title X clinics and a national sample of low-income women, 1 CONTRACEPTION:
X 100004 (2019).
34. See, e.g., Janice Hopkins Tanne, Trump’s proposals would restrict US
abortions and deny sexual health services for millions, 361 BMJ 1 (2018); Eve
Espey & Charlotte Pickett, Don’t mess with Title X, vital for women’s health, 63
CONTEMPORARY OB/GYN (Sept. 2018); Lesley M. Harlem, Federal Court 
Grants Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Blocking New Title X “Gag Rule”
from Taking Effect, SYRACUSE L. REV. (May 2, 2019), https://lawreview.syr
.edu/federal-court-grants-nationwide-preliminary-injunction-blocking-new-title-
x-gag-rule-from-taking-effect/ [https://perma.cc/25QQ-N9GS].
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4572021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
program, but certainly not the last.35 Those individuals who use Title X-
funded clinics are often the youth, members of the LGBTQ+ community,
low-income people of color or with disabilities, and those living in rural
communities who are underinsured or uninsured. Consequently, these 
groups will be left especially vulnerable to reduced access to healthcare, 
if any at all.
II. THE INNOVATIVE? 2019 ALABAMA “BABY ROE” CASE
Alabama no doubt has become one of the most conservative states in
the country regarding abortion. In the past, its legislature has traditionally
prevented women from accessing abortion, unless their health or lives
were in danger. Similarly, in 2013, in the case of Ex Parte Ankrom, the
Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the state’s chemical endangerment law,
originally written to protect children from dangerous labs, can be used to
prosecute women who use drugs during pregnancy.36 Furthermore, in 2019
Alabama enacted a total ban on abortion with a consequent criminal
penalty of imprisonment for up to 99 years for physicians who perform it.
Consequently, “unborn children” are legal people for all intents and
purposes. For example, in Alabama’s criminal code the word “person”
refers to an “unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless
of viability,”37 and another law states that it is the “public policy of this
35. See Sarah Primrose, The Attack on Planned Parenthood: A Historical
Analysis, 19 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 165 (2012); Planned Parenthood Withdraws
From Title X Due To Trump's Abortion Rule, FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (Aug. 29,
2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/08/planned-parent
hood-withdraws-from-title-x-due-to-trumps-abortion-rule-.html [https://perma.
cc/UA22-8UR3]; Janice Hopkins Tanne, AMA and Planned Parenthood sue to
halt new US restrictions on abortion, 364 BMJ 1102 (2019).
36. See Alisha Marano, Punishing Is Helping: An Analysis of the Implications
of Ex Parte Ankrom and How the Intervention of the Criminal Justice System Is a
Step in the Right Direction toward Combating the National Drug Problem and
Protecting the “Child,” 35 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 113 (2013); Michele Goodwin,
Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional Battlefront, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 781, 788 (2014); Catherine Langford, On Making <Person>s:
Ideographs of Legal <Person>hood, 52 ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 125, 135 
(2015); see also Alex Wigglesworth, Her baby was stillborn because of meth,
police say. Now she’s charged with murder, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019, 12:31
PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-11-08/woman-charged-with-
murder-after-delivering-stillborn-baby [https://perma.cc/TZV4-N9ZZ].
37. See Kristie M. Pierce, Pregnancy, Drug Use, and the Unborn Child:
When a Baby’s Lifeline Leads to Neonatal Drug Withdrawal, 9 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 181, 191 n.94 (2014); Marion Abecassis, Artificial Wombs: The Third Era
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458 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
state to ensure the protection of the rights of the unborn child in all
manners and measures lawful and appropriate.”38 
In March 2019, the “Baby Roe” case in Alabama sparked a bitter
debate about the real meaning and possible far-reaching consequences of
the court’s ruling in taking Alabama’s pro-life conception to an extreme.39 
Judge Frank Barger of the Madison County Probate Court allowed a man, 
Ryan Magers, whose girlfriend had ended a pregnancy two years earlier,
to sue an unknown pharmaceutical company, the manufacturer of the pill
she had used, and the clinic that gave it to her, Alabama Women’s Center
for Reproductive Alternatives, LLC. This 21-year-old man had been in a
relationship with his girlfriend, age 14, when she became pregnant, but
they never got married. He claimed that when they discovered she was
pregnant in early 2017, he “repeatedly pleaded” with her to carry the
pregnancy to term and give birth, but she wanted to have an abortion.40 
The bottom line of his complaint was as follows:
On February 10, 2017, per the appointment, the Mother went to
the Alabama Women’s Center to proceed with the abortion. Baby
Roe was approximately six weeks old on February 10, 2017. The
Defendants gave the Mother a pill, which she took, that induced
of Human Reproduction and the Likely Impact on French and U.S. Law, 27 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 3, 13 n.83 (2016); Myrisha S. Lewis, Criminalizing
Substance Abuse and Undermining Roe v. Wade: The Tension between Abortion
Doctrine and the Criminalization of Prenatal Substance Abuse, 23 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 185, 202–03 (2017).
38. ALA. CONST. amend. 930, § (b); see Craig A. Shirley, Alabama’s
Wrongful Death Act and the Unborn Plaintiff, 49 CUMB. L. REV. 195, 199–200 
(2018); Rebecca B. Reingold & Lawrence O. Gostin, State Abortion Restrictions
and the New Supreme Court: Women’s Access to Reproductive Health Services, 
322 JAMA 21 (2019); Kari White et al., Change in Second-Trimester Abortion
After Implementation of a Restrictive State Law, 133 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 771 (2019).
39. See Fox et al. supra note 25.
40. See, e.g., Jill Filipovic, The terrifying case of a six-week embryo suing an
abortion clinic, GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com
/commentisfree/2019/mar/08/the-terrifying-case-of-a-six-week-embryo-suing-an
-abortion-clinic [https://perma.cc/7KJ3-LS4R]; Ariana Eunjung Cha & Emily
Wax-Thibodeaux, Alabama judge allows man to sue clinic on behalf of aborted
fetus, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/health/2019/03/06/alabama-judge-allows-man-sue-clinic-behalf-aborted-fetus/
[https://perma.cc/7TVR-8B8L]; Nicole Rojas, Alabama Man Suing Abortion
Clinic on Behalf of His Girlfriend’s Unborn Fetus, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2019,
7:04 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/alabama-man-allowed-sue-abortion-
clinic-behalf-his-unborn-fetus-1354404 [https://perma.cc/C3K5-ZMZE].
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4592021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
the death of Baby Roe. As a result of the Defendants’ actions,
Plaintiff’s child, Baby Roe, was killed. . . . The pill that
Defendants manufactured, distributed, and gave to the Mother
caused Baby Roe’s death. Defendants, separately and severally,
wrongfully caused Baby Roe’s death.41 
Normatively speaking, this case recognizes, for perhaps the first time
in American history, the legal rights of an aborted embryo, awarding him 
full status as a person and, inter alia, countenancing his status as a co-
plaintiff in suing for his “wrongful death.”42 As mentioned at the outset of
this article, some scholars described the case as “a troubling court
decision,” because “[b]y elevating the legal status of the fetus, the
Alabama judgment provides at least indirect support for all manner of
restrictions on women’s interests and reproductive freedom. . . . Magers’
suit reflects a troubling trend in the dozen states that let fetal interests
supersede that of women.”43 
In these scholars’ view, as if this dramatic ruling were not troubling
enough from a substantive aspect, it is also problematic on procedural
grounds. Due to the fact that the new Alabama anti-abortion law is
unenforceable because it directly contradicts the Supreme Court ruling of
Roe v. Wade, what this means jurisprudentially is that the latter overrides
the former. In stark contrast to the legislative avenue, however, this new
case does not necessarily require overturning Roe v. Wade. Furthermore,
these scholars are deeply worried about opening Pandora’s Box by
allowing physicians to be sued by fetuses and other bizarre possibilities 
that accompany expanding the variety of potential defendants.44 
The latter concern is viable, for since this case was decided in March
2019, at least one court has rendered a more troubling and astonishing
ruling concerning fetal rights. Marshae Jones, age 27, was five months
41. See Complaint at 3–5, Magers v. Ala. Women’s Ctr. for Reprod.
Alternatives, LLC, No. 47-CV-2019-900259.00 (Cir. Ct. Madison Cnty. Feb. 5,
2019).
42. See Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV.
1043 (1965); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Rights of Embryo and Foetus in Private
Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 633, 642, 646 (2002); DOV FOX, BIRTH RIGHTS AND 
WRONGS: HOW MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY ARE REMAKING REPRODUCTION
AND THE LAW (2019).
43. Fox et al., supra note 25, at E1; see also Cha & Wax-Thibodeaux, supra
note 40; see also Rosemary Westwood, What Will Alabama’s ‘Baby Roe’ Lawsuit
Mean for the Abortion Debate?, PAC. STANDARD (Mar. 15, 2019), https://
psmag.com/social-justice/an-alabama-lawsuit-is-bringing-mens-desires-into-the-
abortion-debate [https://perma.cc/H428-DHYH].
44. Fox et al., supra note 25, at E1.
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460 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
pregnant when she got into a fight with a 23-year-old coworker in
December 2018 in Alabama. The coworker was losing the fight when she
pulled out a gun and fired. The bullet killed Jones’ five-month-old fetus.
Jones was arrested after a grand jury issued an indictment asserting that
she intentionally caused the death of her fetus by starting a fight, charging
her with the loss of her own pregnancy, based on the claim that being
pregnant, and being the victim of what would ordinarily be viewed as a 
crime, is itself a crime.45 
Thus, as some scholars foresaw, a pregnant woman was convicted,
with the protection of “unborn life” providing the basis for her arrest, only
because she was pregnant, and even though she was herself a shooting
victim. This occurrence relates to Michele Goodwin’s longstanding
critique of how women can be punished unjustly only because they are
pregnant,46 since the only reasonable justification for turning Jones from
the victim of a crime into a criminal perpetrating no less than a felony is
her pregnancy.
Arguably, on the other hand, one may cast doubt on the allegedly
revolutionary and far-reaching meaning and consequences of the Alabama 
“Baby Roe” case. A careful examination of the state’s judicial history
reveals the clearly stringent trajectory of its jurisprudence even long before
this “troubling court decision.” During the years 1972 to 1974, there was
a cluster of three cases before the state supreme court. 47 The first ruling in
this trilogy, Huskey v. Smith, determined that courts should recognize a
45. See Francie Diep, The Alabama Woman Charged With Her Fetus’ Death
Is Part of a Long History of Blaming Black Women for Harm to Their Unborn, 
PAC. STANDARD (June 28, 2019), https://psmag.com/news/the-alabama-woman-
charged-with-her-fetus-death-is-part-of-a-long-history [https://perma.cc/RL8F-
W3RP]; Josiah Bates, An Alabama Woman Was Charged After Someone Else 
Killed Her Fetus. Critics Say New Laws Are ‘Criminalizing Pregnancy,’ TIME
(July 3, 2019, 4:37 PM), https://time.com/5616371/alabama-woman-charged-
criminalizing-pregnancy/ [https://perma.cc/9B9H-8HAN]; National Advocates
for Pregnant Women, Alabama Must Stop Prosecuting Pregnant Women, MS.
(July 5, 2019), https://msmagazine.com/2019/07/05/alabama-must-stop-prosecut
ing-pregnant-women/ [https://perma.cc/3W3X-UZPM].
46. Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1657
(2007); Michele Goodwin, The Pregnancy Penalty, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 17 
(2016); MICHELE GOODWIN, POLICING THE WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD (2019); see also Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne
Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United
States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 
J. HEALTH, POLITICS & POL’Y L. 299 (2013).
47. See Huskey v. Smith, 265 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1972); Wolfe v. Isbell, 280
So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1973); Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974).
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4612021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
wrongful death claim arising from a prenatal injury to a fetal child, even
though he had been born alive but later died.48 The second, Wolfe v. Isbell, 
enabled the parent of a child to bring a wrongful-death cause of action
when the latter, who had been born alive, died from prenatal injuries that
were negligently inflicted on the fetus, even though it was nonviable.49 
Lastly, in Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, in very similar circumstances, the
court dealt with the case of a child who suffered prenatal injuries and was 
not born alive.50 
In its reasoning in the Eich decision, the court explicitly stated that
“due to the pervading public purpose of our wrongful death statute, which
is to prevent homicide through punishment of the culpable party,”51 
parents were permitted to bring a wrongful-death action for the death of
their stillborn fetus. Contrarily, approximately 20 years later, in two cases
decided on the same date,52 the court regressed from the trend of expanding
the meaning of “minor child” as set previously. Eventually, however, two
more recent cases53 again adopted the same broader interpretation,
48. See Huskey v. Smith, 265 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1972); see also Gary J.
Rickner, Wrongful Death - Prenatal Injuries - Claim Allowed Where Fetus Viable
at Time of Injury and Child Born Alive, 4 CUMB.-SAMFORD L. REV. 200, 200–01
(1973); Juliet G. St. John, Wrongful Death - Prenatal Injuries - Action Allowed
Where Fetus Is Eight and One-Half Months at Time of Injury and Subsequently 
Stillborn, 5 CUMB.-SAMFORD L. REV. 362, 363–66 (1974); David W. McDowell,
Torts - Wrongful Death - Nonviable Fetus Is Not a Minor Child under Alabama’s
Wrongful Death Act, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 159, 161–75 (1993).
49. Wolfe, 280 So. 2d 758; see also Frank J. Hartye, Tort Recovery for the 
Unborn Child, 15 J. FAM. L. 276, 280, 287 (1976); Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 47–54, 120 (1993); Marisa L. Mascaro, Preconception Tort 
Liability: Recognizing a Strict Liability Cause of Action for DES Grandchildren, 
17 AM. J. L. & MED. 435, 438, 441 (1991).
50. See Eich, 300 So. 2d 354; see also David Kader, The Law of Tortious
Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 MO. L. REV. 639, 642–62 (1980); Sheryl
Anne Symonds, Wrongful Death of the Fetus: Viability Is Not a Viable
Distinction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 103, 104–08 (1984); Rodney A. Max, A
New Tort in Alabama: Wrongful Employment Termination in Violation of Public
Policy, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 39, 50–51 (1988).
51. Eich, 300 So. 2d 354; see also Max, supra note 50, at 50; Shirley, supra
note 38, at 207.
52. Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1993); Lollar v. Tankersley,
613 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. 1993).
53. See Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011) (“[The Brody Act’s]
change constitutes clear legislative intent to protect even nonviable fetuses from
homicidal acts.”); Stinnett v. Kennedy, 232 So. 3d 202 (Ala. 2016); Shirley, supra
note 38, at 222.
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462 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
reinforcing the extremely stringent conception of fetal rights in Alabama.
Moreover, under the state’s current Wrongful Death Act, the term “minor
child” now includes any person, or fetus, regardless of viability, and
physicians are not exempt from any civil liability for a death that occurs
as a result of their actions. As was precisely summed up recently, “The 
Alabama Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Mack and Stinnett have 
continued the trend started by the trilogy of rulings in Huskey, Wolfe, and
Eich expanding the wrongful-death law in favor of unborn children and
have done away with viability as a standard.”54 
Presumably, it can still be claimed that the “Baby Roe” ruling is more
extreme than all its predecessors, since it does not deal with a married
couple who together sue a third party for the loss of their almost mature,
stillborn baby. In the “Baby Roe” case, the man—who was not married to
the 14-year-old minor—sued the two third parties that had been involved
in the abortion, the unknown pharmaceutical company, and the clinic that
had given her the medication, while wisely not suing the woman. One
could reasonably doubt whether it makes any sense to give birth to a child
under such circumstances, where a young minor was not married to the
father, which may profoundly damage his best interests and basic rights.55 
Furthermore, the abortion had been conducted only six weeks into the
pregnancy, early in the first trimester, which is when almost all induced
abortions occur, and only a handful of states, namely, Louisiana, Georgia,
Kentucky, Mississippi, and Ohio, prohibit abortion at this early stage of
gestation.56 
54. Shirley, supra note 38, at 222; see also Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728
(Ala. 2012) (“Viability is irrelevant to determining the existence of prenatal 
injuries, the extent of prenatal injuries, or the cause of prenatal death. Viability is
irrelevant to proving causation . . . .”). 
55. See I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187, 1203
n.48 (2012); DAVID BOONIN, THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM AND THE ETHICS OF
FUTURE PEOPLE (2014).
56. See Yehezkel Margalit, Abortion, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN
AMERICA: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CONTROVERSIES (Jaimee L. Hartenstein ed.,
forthcoming 2021); ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note 7, at 4–6; Nash,
supra note 1, at 498.
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  73 2/5/21  12:55 PM




     
 










   
  
    
  
 
        
      
    
         
     
      
    
 
     
       
     
  
   
          
        
   
     
    
    
 
       
        
4632021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
III. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND PROTECTING HIS RIGHTS
As recently explored elsewhere,57 in the last few decades society has 
witnessed a strengthening of the rights of individuals who are part of an
intact marriage, including children’s rights.58 In the past, the law treated 
the child socially and legally as an object that belongs to his parents.
Because the law did not recognize children as subjects with independent
legal status, they were deprived of any legal rights or recognized interests.
Put differently, childhood status denied the child the rights and interests
that society ascribes to any mature person. However, the gradual reduction
of this status began in the 18th century and reached its peak in the mid-
20th century, with judicial recognition of children’s constitutional rights,59 
the emergence of social movements such as the Children’s Rights
Movement,60 and the enactment of international conventions bolstering
children’s rights, the most important being the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC).61 Notably, several scholars, whom we
would like to join, forcefully claim that the revolution in children’s rights
57. See YEHEZKEL MARGALIT, DETERMINING LEGAL PARENTAGE: BETWEEN
FAMILY LAW AND CONTRACT LAW 85–89 (2019); see also THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW (James G. Dwyer ed., 2019).
58. See HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 5–13 (2005); see also Sarah
Abramowicz, Childhood and the Limits of Contract, 21 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 37
(2009); see also MARGALIT, supra note 57, at 107–15; Bruce C. Hafen, The 
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy–Balancing the
Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 511–17 (1983).
59. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children
and the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REV. 345, 400–09 (1997); Wendy
A. Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children’s Perspectives and the
60. See JOSEPH M. HAWES, THE CHILDREN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A
HISTORY OF ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION (1991); Annie Franklin & Bob
Franklin, Growing Pains: The Developing Children’s Rights Movement in the
UK, in THATCHER’S CHILDREN? POLITICS, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY IN THE 
1980S AND 1990S 94 (Jane Pilcher & Stephen Wagg eds., 1996); Gary A. Debele,
Custody and Parenting by Persons Other Than Biological Parents: When Non-
Traditional Family Law Collides with the Constitution, 83 N.D. L. REV. 1227,
1246–52 (2007).
61. See G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20,
1989); see also TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW (2014).
.34, 110 (1994)– 11, 22.EVRL..RIZ, 36 ALaw 
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464 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
has not yet reached its peak, and that we should continue to fight to reach
this deserving destination.62 
The shift in the legal status of children is clearly reflected in two main
doctrines: the best interests of the child (BIC) and the protection of the
child’s rights. The former is much older and has long served as the ultimate
factor in any process of making decisions or conducting any legal action
regarding children. It is embedded explicitly in various jurisdictions, both
in local legislation63 and in the judiciary system, as well as in international
conventions. Likewise, over time, but especially since the end of the 20th 
century with the strengthening of the human rights discourse, the BIC
doctrine has also been invigorated. Calls for the recognition of children’s
rights were heard already in the 1960s to 1970s,64 but they have become
amplified in the writing in this field since then.
Thus, with the penetration of the human rights discourse into the
institution of marriage and family law, and with the assimilation of the
understanding that children are autonomous agents,65 society is witnessing
an accelerated legal discussion of children’s rights in a variety of
scenarios: the right of the child to receive his maintenance and all his
needs; the child’s entitlement to demand his separation from his parents;
the cancellation of tort immunity for parents and the consequent flood of
negligence claims by children against their parents; the right of the child
to be represented separately from his parents in any legal procedure and to
be directly heard by the judge regarding his custody; and more. These
entitlements are very important in any case where conflict may arise
between a child and his parents, such as when considering whether to 
rescind the latter’s legal parenthood due to their neglect or abuse of the
child; the right of the child to know his genealogical origins and the
identity of his parents; the entitlement to be adopted; any dilemma of
relocation, which requires consideration of the BIC; and recognition of the
.(2008)ATETIONELLRANKLIN TOFENBIGHTS FROMRS’HILDRENC 
62. See, e.g., JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN
(2006); BARBARA B. WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
64. See, e.g., PAUL ADAMS ET AL., CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: TOWARD THE
LIBERATION OF THE CHILD (1971); Henry H. Foster & Doris J. Freed, A Bill of
Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L. Q. 343 (1972).
65. See Katherine H. Federle, An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights of 
Children, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1585 (1995); see also Michael S. Wald, Children’s
Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 .C.D. L. REV. 255, 260–81 (1979).
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4652021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
equal or even special rights of children born to same-sex couples or,
alternatively, to racial minorities and other protected groups.66 
As mentioned above, several international conventions anchor the
rights of children as a basic human right due to their special needs,
including the BIC as a central consideration in any legislation aimed at
promoting children’s welfare.67 Moreover, several scholars and rulings
have held that in any given conflict between the parents’ rights and the
rights of the children, the latter should prevail.68 In the present context, the 
issue is whether the law should extend this brand new conception to the
prenatal fetus also, with all the obvious difficulties and challenges that
entails. There are even radical calls for abolishing the parental right to raise
one’s children and for converting it into only a narrow parental legal
privilege to make any decision regarding the children, if it is not damaging
to one of the child’s interests.69 It should be emphasized that the discourse
on children’s rights is clearly undermining the traditional framework of
both family autonomy and parental authority, and actually outspokenly
criticizes the accepted social order. 
There is a contrary opinion, unsurprisingly, that maintains that
children’s rights cannot exist independently from their parents’ rights.70 In
the context of abortion, one might justly claim that the absolute rights of
the mature mother should easily override the contested rights of the unborn
fetus. In addition, others argue that there is an irrebuttable presumption 
66. See Yehezkel Margalit, Determining Legal Parentage by Agreement 74– 
75 (2011) (Ph.D. thesis, Bar-Ilan University) (on file with author).
67. See G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20,
1989); see also LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD: UNITED NATIONS LAWMAKING ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1995); Yehezkel
Margalit, From Baby M to Baby M(anji): Regulating International Surrogacy
Agreements, 24 J. L. & POL’Y 41, 59–62 (2016).
68. See Janet L. Richards, Redefining Parenthood: Parental Rights Versus
Child Rights, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1227 (1994) (arguing that the BIC should trump
the rights of the parents); Dolgin, supra note 59 (arguing that the BIC is the 
superior factor over parental autonomy); see also Annette R. Appell, Uneasy 
Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L. J. 141, 171 
(2004); Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equality? The Legal
Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42 (2008).
69. See James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare:
Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994).
70. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 13– 
14 (2005); Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635 (2002); Elizabeth
S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children's Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 1071 (2003); Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights? Why Less is More, 
11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1101 (2003).
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466 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
that what is good for the parents will always be good also for their
children.71 Thus, the law definitely should not withdraw the parents’ rights
because of the rights of their children, especially since the harm to the
entitlements of the former cannot be constitutional.72 An even more
extreme contention maintains that in the long run giving exaggerated
consideration to children’s rights may be harmful to children themselves,73 
due to, inter alia, the fact that the rights of children are too wide and
amorphous, and have still not been accorded enough political and
philosophical recognition. Because the human rights discourse has been
created in the adult world, unfortunately the appropriate method for
translating it into the children’s realm has not yet been found.74 
IV. A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE FETUS’S RIGHTS?
After having explored the general strengthening of the two
doctrines—the BIC and the protection of their rights—this Part, the main
normative chapter of this Article, will start the exploration with one of the
most substantial and central pillars of the abortion dilemma: whether the
fetus has any rights at all. A supplementary question is whether the recent
shifts and developments in the American legal system have elevated these
rights to a new high. 
The debate over fetal rights is ancient. Nonetheless the ontological
status of the fetus can be treated as a separate and independent issue apart
from its moral status, though they traditionally have been discussed as an
intertwined dilemma.75 Although we absolutely agree with the claim that
71. See John C. Duncan, The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures from
Parental Reinforcement: The Journey to Family Integrity, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1240 
(2005).
72. See id.; David D. Meyer, Reforming Parentage Laws: The
Constitutionality of “Best Interests” Parentage, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
857 (2006); see also Naomi Cahn, Parental Rights and CRISPR, SMU SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
73. See Barbara B. Woodhouse, Talking About Children’s Rights in Judicial
Custody and Visitation Decision-Making, 36 FAM. L. Q. 105, 107 (2002); Bruce 
C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L. REV. 606 (1976).
74. See Appell, supra note 68; Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to
Children’s Rights?, 80 MINN. L. REV. 267 (1995).
75. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, supra note 7, at 8; see also Michael J.
Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 
77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 531 (1989); MARY A. WARREN, MORAL STATUS:
OBLIGATIONS TO PERSONS AND OTHER LIVING THINGS (1997); STEPHEN NAPIER,
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2021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT 467
“critical debate over the moral status of an embryo or fetus waits in the
shadows,”76 this Part focuses only on one aspect of it: the fetus’s rights.
Undoubtedly, one of the most important turning points in the
recognition of the legitimate rights of the fetus is the oft-cited American
ruling of Roe v. Wade.77 In this seminal case, as well as in Doe v. Bolton,78 
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized and legalized the right of a woman to 
abort her fetus only during the first trimester. During the second trimester, 
however, the state may regulate abortion, if it reasonably relates to the
preservation and protection of the woman. After the point of viability,
when the fetus is capable of surviving outside the womb, approximately 
23 to 24 weeks into pregnancy,79 the state has a compelling interest in
protecting human life.80 Thus, states can regulate or even proscribe entirely 
PERSONS, MORAL WORTH, AND EMBRYOS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PRO-
CHOICE ARGUMENTS (2011).
76. Borgmann, supra note 7, at 263.
77. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD
HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST 
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005); HULL & HOFFER, supra
note 6; MARY ZIEGLER, BEYOND ABORTION: ROE V. WADE AND THE BATTLE FOR
PRIVACY (2018); Bertha John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920 (1973); D. H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979); Bertha A. Manninen, Rethinking Roe v. Wade: 
Defending the Abortion Right in the Face of Contemporary Opposition, 10 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 33 (2010).
78. See Norman Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the Right
of Abortion, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 867 (1974); Richard Delgado & Juith Droz Keyes,
Parental Preferences and Selective Abortion: A Commentary on Roe v. Wade, 
Doe v. Bolton, and the Shape of Things to Come, 1974 WASH. U. L. Q. 203 (1974);
STEPHEN M. KRASON, ABORTION: POLITICS, MORALITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
A CRITICAL STUDY OF ROE V. WADE AND DOE V. BOLTON AND A BASIS FOR CHOICE
(1984).
79. As if the accurate determination of the viability point were not vague and
amorphous enough, there have been bitter criticisms of this point as the
appropriate watershed line between permissible and non-permissible abortion.
See Hyun Jee Son, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling
Viability’s Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 213 (2005); Randy 
Beck, The Essential Holding of Casey: Rethinking Viability, 75 UMKC L. REV.
713 (2007); I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and
the Constitution, 39 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 235 (2011).
80. See, e.g., Mary Anne Wood & Lisa Bolin Hawkins, State Regulation of
Late Abortion and the Physician’s Duty of Care to the Viable Fetus, 45 MO. L.
REV. 394 (1980); Sam S. Balisy, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide
Legal Protection for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1987); PNINA LIFSHITZ-
AVIRAM, ABORTIONS - A MOUTH FOR THOSE WITH NO VOICE: WOMEN’S RIGHT
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468 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
a woman’s right to end the life of her unborn child once the child is
considered viable. Put differently, the flip side of these groundbreaking
verdicts is the constitutionally recognized right of the viable fetus to be
born, and the rights of the pregnant woman should at the least be restricted
in light of this right.81 
But even after these revolutionary rulings and as of this writing,82 the 
debate over the fetus’s rights has continued to spark much moral and
ethical discussion,83 to draw media attention, and to give rise to a prolific
legal scholarship. The main reason for this unusual phenomenon is that the
recognition of fetal rights should reasonably derive from the more basic
but extremely complicated question of whether a fetus is indeed a person
and has personhood in philosophical and legal terms—a dilemma that the
Supreme Court elegantly dodged.84 Furthermore, even if one assumes that
the fetus is a person,85 or even equivalent to that, the question remains as 
to how the fetus’s rights and the woman’s rights should justly be balanced.
V. FETUS RIGHTS – DOES A FETUS HAVE A MORAL PERSONALITY? (forthcoming
2021, on file with the authors).
81. Barry, supra note 17 (“The term foetal rights came into wide usage 
following the Roe v. Wade case . . . .”); see also Jeffrey L. Lenow, The Fetus as a
Patient: Emerging Rights as a Person, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 1 (1983); Charles J.
Dougherty, The Right to Begin Life with Sound Body and Mind: Fetal Patients
and Conflicts with Their Mothers, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 89 (1985).
82. See, e.g., CAROLE E. JOFFE, DOCTORS OF CONSCIENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO
PROVIDE ABORTION BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE (1995); ZIEGLER, supra
note 6; JOHANNA SCHOEN, ABORTION AFTER ROE: ABORTION AFTER
LEGALIZATION (2015).
83. See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 22; Schedler, supra note 22; Singh et al.,
supra note 22; Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflict with
Woman’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95
YALE L. J. 599 (1986); Lori K. Mans, Liability for the Death of a Fetus: Fetal
Rights or Women’s Rights, 15 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 295 (2004); Ursula
Barry, Discourses on Foetal Rights and Women’s Embodiment, in ABORTION 
PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2 (Aideen Quilty et al. eds., 2013).
84. See Roger J. Magnuson & Joshua M. Lederman, Aristotle, Abortion, and
Fetal Rights, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 767 (2007); Lee R. Collins & Susan L.
Crockin, Fighting ‘Personhood’ Initiatives in the United States, 24 REPROD.
BIOMED. ONLINE 689 (2012); J. F. Will, Beyond Abortion: Why the Personhood
Movement Implicates Reproductive Choice, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 573 (2013).
85. See, e.g., Jane English, Abortion and the Concept of a Person, 5
CANADIAN J. PHIL. 233 (1975); Gary B. Gertler, Brain Birth: A Proposal for
Defining When a Fetus Is Entitled to Human Life Status, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1061
(1986); Lynne Rudder Baker, When Does a Person Begin?, 22 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 25 (2005); Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades
of Family Law, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 459 (2007).
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However, in stark contrast to the debate over abortion, which, as
mentioned above, is still stuck in a deadlock, the academic discussion of
the fetus’s rights has been strengthening exponentially. Even a superficial
survey of the ethical and legal literature over the past two decades quickly
reveals the extent to which the recognition of these rights has expanded.
Since the start of the 2000s, every year scholars have written
approximately 100 to 150 articles regarding the fetus’s rights, with the
peak around the years 2012 to 2017.86 There are at least two main reasons 
for this strengthening process. First, there is the more general ascension of
the discourse of the BIC and the protection of his rights, which have been 
penetrating step by step into the abortion dilemma. Second, there are the
endless efforts of the pro-life movement to outlaw abortion at any cost.87 
As already noted above, the dilemma of whether a fetus is a person, or at
least equivalent to that, with all the obvious consequential rights, is one of
the bitterest bones of contention between the supporters and opponents of
abortion.88 
As opposed to the traditional contentions that only a mature person
should have the full range of human rights, and that the fetus, even one
who is fully viable and about to be born, should be excluded from them,89 
86. See, e.g., JUDE IBEGBU, RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN CHILD IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000); JOSEPH, supra note 24; EMMA CAVE, THE MOTHER
OF ALL CRIMES: HUMAN RIGHTS, CRIMINALIZATION AND THE CHILD BORN ALIVE
(2018); Philip Alston, The Unborn Child and Abortion under the Draft 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 156 (1990); Nova D.
Janssen, Fetal Rights and the Prosecution of Women for Using Drugs during
Pregnancy, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 741 (2000); Tanya Goldman, Vo v. France and
Fetal Rights: The Decision Not to Decide, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 277 (2005).
87. See CAROL MASON, KILLING FOR LIFE: THE APOCALYPTIC NARRATIVE
OF PRO-LIFE POLITICS (2002); ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE 
ACTIVISTS: HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION WORKS (2010); Joona
Räsänen, Why pro-life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics, 
32 BIOETHICS 628 (2018).
88. See supra notes 83–84; see also David Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The
Potential Reach of a Human Life Amendment, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 97 (1982); JEAN 
REITH SCHROEDEL, IS THE FETUS A PERSON?: A COMPARISON OF POLICIES
ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES (2000); Joshua J. Craddock, Protecting Prenatal
Persons: Does the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibit Abortion?, 40 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 539 (2017).
89. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of
Double Effect, 5 OXFORD REV. 5 (1967); Karen G. Crockett & Miriam Hyman,
Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to Recognition of Rights, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV.
805 (1976); Rhonda Copelon et al., Human Rights Begin at Birth: International
Law and the Claim of Fetal Rights, 13 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 120 (2005).
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470 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
more and more philosophers and legal scholars, whom we would like to
join,90 argue precisely the opposite: that a fetus, especially a viable one, is
much more akin to a person than otherwise and therefore should have
rights. As has been pointedly argued, “If a state has an obligation to protect
the life of this child the moment after it is born, the state undoubtedly
should exercise its right to protect this child the moment before it is
born.”91 
Similarly, although scholars have debated the notion of fetal rights
over the past decades in many jurisdictions through their courts and legal
systems, only recently have several countries explicitly anchored the rights
of the fetus both judicially and legislatively. For example, “Ireland, as one
of a small number of countries that have integrated fetal rights into statute
and constitutional law . . . could influence future decisions in an altered
U.S. Supreme Court.”92 
Obviously, the debate over which kind or range of rights precisely
should be ascribed to the fetus is legitimate, but, in any event, the most 
basic human right to be born is among them.93 As one scholar recently
concluded:
A viable fetus is a beginning-of-a-person and even a beginning-
of-a-person is entitled to rights similar in essence to the rights of
a human being. . . . I have seen fit to establish this model and have
sought to place a legal and moral obligation for the viable fetus on
the pregnant woman. In a similar way, even an approach that sees
90. See PNINA LIFSHITZ-AVIRAM, DELICATE BALANCE (2016); LIFSHITZ-
AVIRAM, supra note 80.
91. Wood & Hawkins, supra note 80, at 422; see also Jessica L. Waters, In 
Whose Best Interest? New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. V.M.
and B.G. and the Next Wave of Court-Controlled Pregnancies, 34 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 81, 111 (2011) (“In doing so, the court extended the child welfare statute
to cover a woman’s actions prior to giving birth and essentially deemed a fetus to
be a ‘child’ under the law.”).
92. Barry, supra note 17; Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and
Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed Human Life Legislation, 68 VA.
L. REV. 333 (1982); Howard Minkoff & Lynn M. Paltrow, The Rights of ‘Unborn 
Children’ and the Value of Pregnant Women, 36 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 26 (2006).
But see Northern Ireland Considering Decriminalization Of Abortion, FAM. L.
PROF. BLOG (Oct. 23, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019
/10/northern-ireland-considering-decriminalization-of-abortion-.html [https://per
ma.cc/L5BL-EFHS].
93. See supra note 22, 24, 83; see also Lynn D. Wardle, When Does a Right
to Life Arise?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW (James 
G. Dwyer ed., 2019).
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4712021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
fit to minimize state intervention in the life of the individual to a
great extent, could justify legislation that recognizes the status of
the viable fetus and its right to life based on the principle of
harm.94 
Incidentally, the discourse of the rights of the fetus is not infrequently 
used merely to disguise the attempt by the pro-life movement to block the
option of abortion.95 This movement has made countless attempts to add
to the U.S. Constitution a Human Life Amendment to protect the life and
rights of the fetus. Starting in 1974, one week after the Supreme Court
decided the famous case of Roe v. Wade, lasting through 1983, when the
Senate held its first and only floor vote on this amendment, and continuing
up to the date of this writing, proponents of this amendment have proposed
or introduced hundreds of versions of it.96 While these constant efforts 
have not yet succeeded, nonetheless numerous American states have
sought to amend their local legislation to prohibit the vast majority of
abortions, on the ground of protecting the fetus’s rights. Besides Alabama,
94. LIFSHITZ-AVIRAM, supra note 80.
95. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD
(1985).
96. See The Personhood Movement: Where it came from and where it stands
today, PROPUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/article/the-personhood-move
ment-timeline [https://perma.cc/DJ7F-APQ9]; see also Westfall, supra note 88;
Manninen, supra note 77; Bertha Alvarez Manninen, Beyond Abortion: The
Implications of Human Life Amendments, 43 J. SOC. PHIL. 140 (2012).
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472 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
these states include Louisiana,97 Kentucky, Georgia,98 Mississippi, Ohio, 
Missouri,99 and others.
V. TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT OF RIGHTS?
Not to discount the foregoing discussion regarding the accelerating
recognition of the BIC and the protection of their rights, extending also to
fetuses, but that is only the first question. We turn now to the much more
acute supplemental question—how these rights should be balanced against
the mother’s rights. At the outset, it is crucial to untie the Gordian knot
between both these sets of rights and the legitimacy of abortion, for the
following three reasons. 
First, it is doubtful whether all the sophisticated deliberations around
the dilemma of abortion concern only rights. Despite the central
97. See Louisiana Law on Abortion To Be Signed by Governor, FAM. L. PROF.
BLOG (May 30, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/05/
louisiana-law-on-abortion-to-be-signed-by-govenor-.html [https://perma.cc/TEB
4-ZKQK]; Louisiana Seeks Supreme Court’s Permission For State Abortion,
FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (July 26, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family
_law/2019/07/louisiana-seeks-supreme-courts-permission-for-state-abortion-law
-.html [https://perma.cc/NX7C-9SRX]; Louisiana May Become First State
Without Abortion Access, FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (Oct. 21, 2019), https://lawpro
fessors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/10/louisiana-may-become-first-state-withou
t-abortion-access-.html [https://perma.cc/Y7YJ-AS66].
98. See A Comparison of the Alabama v. Georgia Abortion Bills, FAM. L.
PROF. BLOG (May 25, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/family_law
/2019/05/a-comparison-of-the-alabama-v-georgia-abortion-bills.html [https://per
ma.cc/MM3M-BJNM]; Georgia Abortion Providers Bring Suit Against State’s 
“Fetal Heartbeat” Law, FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (June 7, 2019), https://law
professors.typepad.com/family_law/2019/07/georgia-abortion-provides-bring-su
it-against-states-fetal-heartbeat-law.html [https://perma.cc/3H8S-29ES]; Laura 
E. Anderson, A Qualitative Content Analysis of Crisis Pregnancy Center
Websites to Assess Medical Misrepresentation in Georgia (2019) (Ph.D. thesis,
Georgia State University), available at https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/iph_theses/
667 [https://perma.cc/P9D7-S97V].
99. See Nash, supra note 1, at 498; Missouri Passes Bill Banning Abortion
After 8 Weeks, FAM. L. PROF. BLOG (May 24, 2019), https://lawprofessors.type
pad.com/family_law/2019/05/ [https://perma.cc/M9JA-Y5N9]; Missouri May 
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4732021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
importance of the rights discourse in the modern, liberal Western world,100 
it is only one facet   the abortion dilemma. This issue undoubtedly
touches on some of the most important and central values and arguments
concerning, on the one hand, choice,101 liberty,102 freedom and 
autonomy,103 and, on the other hand, the sanctity of life,104 parental
responsibility,105 and commitments and duties.106 Suffice it to mention 
100. See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND 
APPLICATIONS (1982); THEORIES OF RIGHTS (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1985);
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (2013).
101. See Suzanne Staggenborg, Coalition Work in the Pro-Choice Movement:
Organizational and Environmental Opportunities and Obstacles, 33 SOC.
PROBLEMS 374 (1986); Suzanne Staggenborg, The Consequences of 
Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement, 53 AM.
SOCIO. REV. 585 (1988); Suzanne Staggenborg, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT:
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION CONFLICT (1991).
102. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of 
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983); Johnsen,
supra note 83; Francis J. Beckwith, Thomson’s Equal Reasonableness Argument
for Abortion Rights: A Critique, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 185 (2004); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (establishing that this liberty is the pregnant 
woman’s own privilege, and she does not need to first secure approval either from
her parents or from her husband); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
103. The feminist criticism straightforwardly has claimed that the woman’s
rights should be superior and the woman should be autonomous to abort her fetus.
See ROSALIND POLLACK PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE: THE 
STATE, SEXUALITY, & REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM (1990); RACHEL ROTH, MAKING 
WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS (2000); FETAL RIGHTS: A
NEW ASSAULT ON FEMINISM (Claudia Malacrida & Jacqueline Low eds., 2008).
104. This is one of the most important, contested pillars of the abortion
dilemma. See, e.g., MARVIN KOHL, THE MORALITY OF KILLING: SANCTITY OF
LIFE, ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA (1974); BARUCH A. BRODY, ABORTION, AND 
THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE: A PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW (1975); Christopher
Belshaw, Abortion, Value and the Sanctity of Life, 11 BIOETHICS 130 (1997).
105. See Keith J. Pavlischek, Abortion Logic and Paternal Responsibilities: 
One More Look at Judith Thomson’s “A Defense of Abortion,” 7 PUB. AFFAIRS 
Q. 341 (1993); David Boonin-Vail, A Defense of “A Defense of Abortion”: On
the Responsibility Objection to Thomson’s Argument, 107 ETHICS 286 (1997); 
Priscilla J. Smith, Responsibility for Life: How Abortion Serves Women’s Interests
in Motherhood, 17 J. L. & POL’Y 97 (2008).
106. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable
Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV.
330 (1985); Wendy K. Mariner et al., Pregnancy, Drugs, and the Perils of
Prosecution, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 30 (1990); ROSAMUND SCOTT, RIGHTS,
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474 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
only Ronald Dworkin, who argued in his famous book Life’s Dominion
that the abortion debate is about the sanctity of life and not whether fetuses
have rights.107 Furthermore, Joseph Raz argues in general that framing
abortion and other controversial ethical issues only in terms of rights is 
irrelevant or narrow.108 As has been previously concluded, “the moral
paradigm of rights and a reductive biological definition of individuality
are inappropriate in trying to understand the moral dimension of the
relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus which she is
carrying.”109 
Second, even within the rights discourse, there is room for the 
contention that the fetus is indeed a person, with the claimed right to be
born, but nonetheless the right of the woman to abort may prevail. As
Judith J. Thomson has famously argued, even the recognized right of the
fetus to life does not entail the right to use another person’s body for
continued sustenance. In other words, even if the fetus is granted full moral
status or personhood with all the accompanying moral and legal rights,
including a healthy birth, the woman’s right to abort can still be
defended.110 As Thomson claimed:
It seems to me that the argument we are looking at can establish
at most that there are some cases in which the unborn person has
DUTIES AND THE BODY: LAW AND ETHICS OF THE MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT
(2002).
107. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (2011). Some scholars,
however, have claimed that the abortion debate may focus more on whether
fetuses have rights than Dworkin assumed. See, e.g., Robert P. George, Book
Review, “Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and
Individual Freedom,” 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 444 (1994); Chris Naticchia, “Life’s
Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom,”
by Ronald Dworkin, 10 J. L. & POL. 339 (1994); Frances M. Kamm, Book Review,
“Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion,” 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 160 (1995).
108. See Joseph Raz, Against Right-Based Morality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS
182 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1985); Rosamond Rhodes, Abortion and Assent, 8
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 416, 416 (1999); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS (Leslie Francis ed., 2017).
109. Eugenie Gatens-Robinson, A Defense of Women’s Choice: Abortion and
the Ethics of Care, 30 S. J. PHIL. 39 (1992).
110. Judith. J. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 47 
(1971); Manninen, supra note 77; Christopher Meyers, Maintaining the Violinist:
A Mother’s Obligations to the Fetus She Decides to Keep, 23 J. SOC. PHIL. 52 
(1992); Pavlischek, supra note 105.
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4752021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
a right to the use of its mother’s body, and therefore some cases
in which abortion is unjust killing. . . . [But] at any rate the
argument certainly does not establish that all abortion is unjust
killing.111 
Her illustration of the abortion dilemma in terms of the ailing violinist,
of course, has drawn considerable objection112 as well as support.113 
Nonetheless, her basic point that even rights argumentation does not
necessarily yield the inevitable conclusion that abortion should be
prohibited is illuminating. On the one hand, she definitely agrees that in
some cases this practice should be permissible, as in cases of early abortion
or during all of pregnancy in the case of rape, although she is inclined to
accept that the fetus is a “human person” even before its delivery.114 On
the other hand, however, she has no intention of claiming that the woman 
has the right to secure the death of the fetus.115 Thus, between these two 
extreme poles, she argues “for the permissibility of abortion in some
cases,” since even granting full moral status to the fetus and recognizing
his most basic human right to be born does not, as a matter of fact, override
the mother’s basic right to decide what will happen with and inside her
body. Thomson asks, “Or should we add to the mother’s right to life her
right to decide what happens in and to her body, which everybody seems
to be ready to grant—the sum of her rights now outweighing the fetus’s
right to life?”116 She goes on to conclude:
111. Thomson, supra note 110, at 49; see also DAVID BOONIN, BEYOND ROE:
WHY ABORTION SHOULD BE LEGAL—EVEN IF THE FETUS IS A PERSON (2019).
112. John Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith
Thomson, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 117, 122–24 (1973); Kenneth Einar Himma,
Thomson’s Violinist and Conjoined Twins, 8 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE 
ETHICS 428 (1999); Mathew Lu, Defusing Thomson’s Violinist Analogy, 39 HUM.
LIFE REV. 46 (2013).
113. See, e.g., Boonin-Vail, supra note 105; Eric Wiland, Unconscious
Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument, 22 J. MED. ETHICS 466 
(2000); DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION (2003).
114. Thomson, supra note 110, at 56, 39, 47–49, 51, 37; see also I. Glenn
Cohen, Are All Abortions Equal? Should There Be Exceptions to the
Criminalization of Abortion for Rape and Incest?, 43 J. L. MED. ETHICS 87 (2015);
Clement Dore, Republicans on Abortion Rights, 14 THINK 9 (2015); Goodwin,
supra note 46.
115. See infra note 131. 
116. Thomson, supra note 110, at 40; JUDITH J. THOMSON, RIGHTS,
RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY (1986); Walter E. Block, 
Judith Jarvis Thomson on Abortion: A Libertarian Perspective, 19 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 1, 7–8 (2017).
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476 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
I am arguing only that having a right to life does not guarantee
having either a right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed
continued use of another person’s body—even if one needs it for
life itself. So the right to life will not serve the opponents of
abortion in the very simple and clear way in which they seem to
have thought it would.117 
To summarize this point, despite the recent acceleration in the
bolstering of the fetus’s moral status and recognition of its rights,118 the 
bitterness and acrimony of the abortion debate will not necessarily abate.
Since even the human rights discourse is very volatile, vague, and
contradictory, to address only this aspect of the issue is inadequate and
incomplete.
Third, in direct continuation of Thomson’s discussion, but in the
contrary direction, even if one assumes that the rights of the woman 
override her fetus’s rights, there is a supplemental consideration. In the
vast majority of cases where consensual sex has yielded the pregnancy, as
has been intensively argued elsewhere, one should consider the essence of
having a conjugal relationship as being an implied agreement to accept the
obvious resulting outcome of this action: the pregnancy. From an ethical
and legal aspect, such voluntary acceptance should incline towards
rejection of any claim of “coerced parenthood,” both from the side of the
father as well as from the side of the mother.119 Thus, the pregnant woman
117. Thomson, supra note 110, at 46; see also Michael Tooley, Abortion and
Infanticide, 2.1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 37, 52 (1972); Himma, supra note 112, at 429;
Manninen, supra note 77, at 39.
118. See Kimberly Mutcherson, Fetal Rights in the Trump Era, 95 TEX. L.
REV., available at https://texaslawreview.org/fetal-rights-trump-era/ [https://per
ma.cc/FD36-3SRU].
119. It should be emphasized that the moral aspect is much more compelling
than the legal one. Since, generally speaking, such personal service is very hard
to be enforced in the vast majority of jurisdictions all over the globe and more
specifically in the English law where it is very rare for contracts to be specifically
enforced. See David Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in
the Entertainment Industry, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 18 (1954); Edward L. Rubin, The
Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts, 3 ENT. & SPORTS L. 3 (1984); Larry
A. DiMatteo, Depersonalization of Personal Service Contracts: The Search for a
Modern Approach to Assignability, 27 AKRON L. REV. 407 (1994). Admittedly,
the moral angle can deeply influence the legal discourse, by claiming that the
woman’s moral obligation towards her fetus may legally prevent her from
aborting him, due to this unique moral estoppel. Apparently, we are not dealing
with enforcing any positive contractual personal service on her but just preventing
her from acting against his interests. For the notion of “moral estoppel,” see
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4772021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
has also responsibility towards the fetus in her womb, to allow it to be
born.120 
Consequently, if indeed the woman carries the fetus to term, the
obligation to provide for the child’s support and all his other needs can be
extrapolated from the implied intention to accept the legal parentage that
may derive from having sexual relations.121 Put differently, a voluntary 
conjugal relationship can teach us about the explicit or at least implied
agreement to accept the obvious consequences of this action: to bring the
child into the world and fulfill all his or her needs. This argument is
supported by the contentions of various scholars who have claimed that
Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 EMORY L. J. 1059,
1067 (1992); Stephan N. Kinsella, New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian
Rights Theory, 12 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 313, 323–324 (1996); N. Stephan
Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights, 30 LOY. L. A. L. REV.
607, 628 n.50 (1997); CFH 2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani [1996] IsrLR 1 (Isr.);
see Ceala E. Breen-Portnoy, Frozen Embryo Disposition in Cases of Separation
and Divorce: How Nahmani v. Nahmani and Davis v. Davis Form the Foundation
for a Workable Expansion of Current International Family Planning Regimes, 28
MED. J. INT’L L. 275, 303 n.201 (2013).
120. See Margalit, supra note 56, at 82–83; Christopher Bruno, A Right to
Decide Not to Be a Legal Father: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Acceptance of
Emotional Harm as a Constitutionally Protected Interest, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
141 (2008); Reed Boland, Population Policies, Human Rights, and Legal Change, 
44 AM. U. L. REV. 1257 (1995); Lisa Lucille Owens, Coerced Parenthood as
Family Policy: Feminism, the Moral Agency of Women, and Men’s Right to
Choose, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013). Incidentally, since not infrequently
birth control fails and even the most reliable forms of birth control have at least a
small potential failure rate, in our opinion, such unintentional procreation is still
much more akin to engaging in consensual sex than the rape scenario, where there
was no intention or agreement to either the sex or its result. Although our
suggestion is most likely to affect lower-income women of color, since the rate of
unintended pregnancy varies dramatically by class, unfortunately this
jurisprudential issue of equality is beyond the scope of the current discussion. See
NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014).
121. See Dorsey v. English, 283 Md. 522 (1978); D.W.L. v. M.J.B.C., 601
S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); see also Smith Holly, Intercourse and Moral 
Responsibility for the Fetus, in ABORTION AND THE STATUS OF THE FETUS 229
(William B. Bonderson et al. eds., 1983); Walen Alec, Consensual Sex without
Assuming the Risk of Carrying an Unwanted Fetus; Another Foundation for the
Right to an Abortion, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1051 (1997); Shari Motro, The Price of
Pleasure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 917 (2010). See also Margalit Yehezkel & Pnina
Lifshitz-Aviram, Abortion and Coronavirus – Between Women's Rights
Discourse and Obligations Discourse (under evaluation).
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478 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
structuring conjugal relations in contractual terminology will yield the
ultimate conclusion that this action can be understood as an agreement to
fulfill the legal consequences, duties, and obligations stemming from it.122 
Lastly, as will be extensively elaborated elsewhere, the right of the
fetus to be born should prevail over the right of his mother not to become
a gestational mother due to the following logical argumentation.123 In the 
past, people have argued that the mere action of giving birth is not enough,
morally and legally, to distinguish between a fetus, which is totally devoid
of any rights, and a “mature,” born person, which has all of them.124 It is
true that “[t]here has been little thorough examination of the process of
birth.”125 In response to this intellectual challenge, it is important to add a 
supplemental layer to this inquiry by claiming that the previous argument
should have become much more convincing in recent years. 
In light of the recent dramatic developments in biomedicine, it is now
possible and safe enough to evacuate the fetus from the womb of his
mother and transfer him to an incubator or even an artificial womb.
Alternatively, an article recently reported that in the foreseeable future it
may be possible to transfer the living evacuated fetus to another woman’s 
womb.126 Anecdotally, it is noteworthy that the most ancient discussion of
122. See Laurence C. Nolan, Legal Strangers and the Duty of Support: Beyond
the Biological Tie – But How Far Beyond the Marital Tie?, 41 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1, 19 (2000); Thomson, supra note 110; Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339,
342–43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights
Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1145, 1162 (2008) (quoting Edward L.
Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478, 483 (1981));
Bruno, supra note 120.
123. See Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent? 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1115 (2008).
124. But see Elizabeth Chloe Romanis, Artificial womb technology and the
significance of birth: why gestatelings are not newborns, 45.11 J. MED. ETHICS
727 (2019).
125. Id. at 727; see also KATE GREASLEY, ARGUMENTS ABOUT ABORTION:
PERSONHOOD, MORALITY, AND LAW (2017); Elizabeth Chloe Romanis, Artificial 
Womb Technology and the Frontiers of Human Reproduction: Conceptual
Differences and Potential Implications, 44 J. MED. ETHICS 751 (2018); Nicholas
Colgrove, Subjects of Ectogenesis: Are “Gestatelings” Fetuses, Newborns, or 
Neither?, 45.11 J. MED. ETHICS 723 (2019).
126. See Alice Broster, A British Couple Just Became The First In The World
To Carry The Same Baby, BUSTLE (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.bustle.com/p/two-
british-women-have-become-the-first-in-the-world-to-carry-the-same-baby-1942
3705 [https://perma.cc/9Z6Y-ZDYY]. It bears emphasis that actually it is simply
a creative ruse. The physicians simply prepare a capsule in which they place the
egg and sperm, insert this capsule into one of the women so that fertilization takes
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4792021] TOWARDS A NEW ARCHIMEDEAN POINT
this futuristic biomedical innovation can be found in a 5th century Jewish
Talmudic hypothetical regarding the uteri of two animals that are adjacent
to each other, with the fetus moving from one uterus to the other before 
being born.127 The viability of exogenesis, or the latter option, even if it 
does not resolve the abortion dilemma,128 nonetheless may strongly incline
one towards recognizing the fetus’s right to be born.129 Against the
recognized right of the mother not to be coerced to become the gestational
parent of the undesired fetus stands the right of the fetus to be born, with
the aid of the abovementioned artificial devices, which do not deprive the
woman of her basic human right not to become a gestational mother
against her will. 
Admittedly, the debate is still ongoing whether the woman has a right
also to kill her fetus,130 but in light of the foregoing discussion, in the vast
majority of cases, at least where the child is a result of consensual
relations, the right of the fetus to be born should prevail. Despite the harsh
implications that the process of detaching the fetus will inevitably have for 
the mother as both a jurisprudential and pragmatic matter. As Thomson
already concluded, “I am not arguing for the right to secure the death of
the unborn child. . . . I agree that the desire for the child’s death is not one
which anybody may gratify, should it turn out to be possible to detach the
child alive.”131 
place “inside her body,” and then remove the capsule and place the fertilized
embryo in the uterus of the second woman for implantation and gestation. Id.
127. See Edward Reichman, Uterine Transplantation and the Case of the 
Mistaken Question, 37 TRADITION: J. ORTHODOX JEWISH THOUGHT 20, 32 (2003).
Pragmatically speaking, this humane option may dramatically reduce the huge
public expense if the fetus is artificially incubated outside the mother’s body,
given the high rate of abortions.
128. Christopher Kaczor, Could Artificial Wombs End the Abortion Debate?, 
5 NAT’L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS Q. 283 (2005); see also Eric Steiger, Not of Woman
Born: How Ectogenesis Will Change the Way We View Viability, Birth, and the
Status of the Unborn, 23 J. L. & HEALTH 143 (2010).
129. See Son, supra note 79; Jessica H. Schultz, Development of Ectogenesis:
How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal Status of a Fetus or Embryo?, 84 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 877 (2010); Glenn Cohen, Artificial Wombs and Abortion
Rights, 47 HASTINGS CTR. REP. (2017), available at https://onlinelibrary
.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/hast.730 [https://perma.cc/8KTE-9GR9].
130. See Joona Räsänen, Ectogenesis, abortion and a right to the death of the
fetus, 31 BIOETHICS 697 (2017); Eric Mathison & Jeremy Davis, Is There a Right
to the Death of the Foetus?, 31 BIOETHICS 313 (2017); Christopher Kaczor,
Ectogenesis and a right to the death of the prenatal human being: A reply to 
Räsänen, 32 BIOETHICS 634 (2018).
131. Thomson, supra note 110, at 55–6.
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480 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has shown the extent to which, despite the 
recent accelerated process of bolstering the fetus’s moral status and
recognition of his rights, the bitterness and acrimony of the abortion debate
will not necessarily abate, since even if one stays exclusively within the
human rights discourse, both sides of the debate may find justification.
This issue undoubtedly touches upon some of our most important and
central values and arguments concerning, on the one hand, choice, liberty, 
freedom and autonomy, and, on the other hand, the sanctity of life, parental
responsibility, and commitments and duties. Moreover, since even the
human rights discourse is volatile, vague, and contradictory, to address
only this aspect of the issue is inadequate and incomplete. 
Given that the abortion debate has played a large role in American
moral, religious, social, and legal history for centuries, it is quite safe to
assume that it will continue to do so long after the current Trump
presidency. The surge, however, in legislative and judiciary restrictions on
abortion of recent years has brought us closer than ever before to a new 
Archimedean point of maternal versus fetal rights, with the latter being
awarded much more credit and room at the expense of the former.132 
132. See, e.g., June Med. Servs. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663 (2019); Caroline
Fredrickson, The Kavanaugh Hearings and the Search for a Just Justice 
Submission, 49 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 67, 72 (2019) (“In his first case in the
Court dealing with abortion, Kavanaugh revealed his interest in cutting back on
access to abortion. By a 5–4 vote, in June Medical Services v. Gee, the Court
enjoined a Louisiana statute that would have ended almost all abortions in the
state.”); see Jo Yurcaba, SCOTUS Will Hear An Abortion Rights Case With Major
Implications BUSTLE (Nov. 13, 2019), https://www.bustle.com/p/scotus-will-
hear-abortion-rights-case-with-major-implications-19301430
[https://perma.cc/F66Z-NRK5].
